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AT WAR: NARRATIVE TACTICS IN THE CITADEL
AND VMI LITIGATION

VALORIE K. VOJDIK*

On August 12, 1995, Shannon Faulkner became the first woman to
join the long gray line of cadets at The Citadel, The Military College of
South Carolina. After she withdrew for medical reasons, Nancy Mellette,
the eighteen-year-old daughter of a Citadel alumnus, stepped forward to
continue the fight to open The Citadel. The battle of these two women
for admission into The Citadel challenges a 152-year-old tradition that
"not only practices inequality, but celebrates it?'1 The Citadel and the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) are the only remaining all-male public
colleges in this nation. Both institutions offer male cadets not only an
undergraduate education in a military-style environment, but also access
to power, wealth, and opportunity, particularly in the South. Legions of
alumni have 2achieved positions of power in government, the military,
and business.
Despite tremendous strides made by women in the United States
military, The Citadel and VMI have devoted millions of dollars to preserve their all-male tradition, fighting their battles in courtrooms and the
media.3 While The Citadel and VMI have conceded that some women
are as qualified as men to succeed in their military-style programs,4 they
have argued that the exclusion of women is justified because The Citadel5
and VMI are single-sex colleges that offer male cadets valuable benefits.
Moreover, they asserted that men and women have different educational
needs and that most women would not benefit from the rigorous military
education offered at these public colleges. 6 Rather than admit women,
South Carolina and Virginia proposed the establishment of separate,
*Instructor of Law, New York University School of Law; J.D., New York University
School of Law, 1986; A.B., Brown University, 1982. The author has served as lead
counsel for Shannon Faulkner and Nancy Mellette in their lawsuit 'eeking admission to
The Citadel.
I Shannon Faulkner v. James Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 234 (4th Cir. 1993) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
2 ee United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992); Citadel's List of
Distinguished Alumni, 1992 (on file with the HarvardWomen's Law Journal).
3See Linda Meggett, Citadel Legal Bill Nears $2 Million, PosT & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 25, 1995, at 1C.
4See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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non-military, programs for women at private women's colleges, financed
7
primarily by $13 million in funds from Citadel and VMI alumni.
Shannon Faulkner v. James Jones8 and United States v. Vrginia9 directly challenge these powerful and traditional institutions, as well as
the social and cultural norms that not only justify the exclusion of
women, but render it natural. In such cases, narrative 0 can be an effective tool to reveal the underlying discrimination against women and to
convince courts to "disrupt" an entrenched social institution. To justify
granting such relief, courts must find that a legal right has been violated
and must be rectified. And to reach that conclusion, a court must construct the facts and circumstances in such a manner so that remedial
action is not only doctrinally, but also morally, compelled. Analysis of
the narrative tactics in The Citadel and VMI litigation offers the opportunity to understand what persuades courts-and public opinion-to join
with women to break traditional gender barriers.
Because the VMI litigation was marked by the absence of any woman
who sought admission, the courts were able to frame the constitutional
conflict as a battle between Virginia and VMI, on the one hand, and the
United States, on the other. Recalling that the parties "first confronted
each other" on "the battlefield at New Market, Virginia," the district
court envisioned the lawsuit as a continuation of the Civil War involving
another "life-and-death" battle over the existence of VMI.11 In characterizing the United States as the enemy intent on forcing its own notions
of equality on Virginia, the court effectively ignored the injuries of the
young women and portrayed VMI and Virginia as the real victims.
In contrast, the federal courts in The Citadel litigation repeatedly
framed the battle as between female candidates for admission and The
7 See Citadel Battle Will Cost Millions, HERALD-J. (Spartanburg, S.C.), Apr. 29, 1995,
at 1; United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 499 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, remanded,
44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995) cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281; Program Agreement Between
The Citadel and Converse College (June 1, 1995) (on file with the Harvard Women's
Law Journal).
8 858 F Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 352 (1995) [hereinafter Faulkner].
9
The opinion of the district court regarding liability is reported at 766 F. Supp. 1407
(W.D. Va. 1992), vacated, remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2431 (1993). The liability cases will hereinafter be described as VMI L
The opinion of the district court regarding remedy is reported at 852 F Supp. 471
(W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, remanded, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 281. The remedy cases will hereinafter be described as VMI 11.
'°As Jerome Bruner explains, we organize our experience and our memory of events
in our lives primarily in narrative form as stories, excuses, or myths that explain our
experience. See Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, CRITICAL INQuIRY, Aug. 1991, at 4. Narrative frames experience and provides a means of constructing meaning from events in the world. See JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 56

(1992).
1 VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1407, 1408.
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Citadel. 12 Shannon Faulkner's and Nancy Mellette's injuries are neither
abstract nor derivative: The Citadel denied them admission solely because they are female. Their struggle invokes the legal concept of equality and individual rights, but within the context of shared cultural traditions. Their effort to gain immediate admission forces The Citadel into
a defensive posture which has led the defendants to engage in a campaign of massive resistance 13 similar to those mounted against racial
desegregation.
This Essay analyzes the narrative choices made by the parties in the
VMI and Citadel litigation. Part I examines and compares the narratives
in the VMI and The Citadel cases. Part II discusses the importance of
individual plaintiffs in gender and racial segregation cases and offers
some personal observations on the hardships that Nancy Mellette and
Shannon Faulkner face in litigating this controversial and high-profile
lawsuit.
I. NARRATIVE CHOICES IN VMI AND THE CITADEL
LITIGATION
A. The Citadel and VMI Save "Single-Gender" Education
In The Citadel and VMI actions, plaintiffs alleged that the male-only
admissions policies of these public colleges violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 In constructing a legal narrative
to justify their facially discriminatory admissions policies, The Citadel
and VMI faced several legal and factual hurdles. Mississippi University
for Women v. Joe Hogan is the only Supreme Court decision which
considered a single-sex admissions policy in higher education under
intermediate scrutiny. 15 In Hogan, the United States Supreme Court held
that the exclusion of men from a state nursing college violated the male
plaintiff's right to equal protection.' 6 The Court rejected Mississippi's
proffered justification that the program compensated women for past
12 See Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 552, 51 F.3d at 440.
13 See Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 567-68.
14The United States filed suit against VMI and the Commonwealth of Virginia on

March 1, 1990, in federal court. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407. Three years later, Shannon
Faulkner sued The Citadel in the District of South Carolina on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated women. The United States intervened as party-plaintiff in May, 1993.
Faulkner, 858 F Supp. 552.
Is458 U.S. 718 (1982). In 1970, the District Court of South Carolina applied a rational
basis test to allow Winthrop College to remain an all-women's college because, inter
alia, Winthrop did not offer a unique course of study. An equally divided Supreme Court
affirmed this decision. D. Reece Williams v. Robert McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 136
(D.S.C. 1970), aff'd without opinion by divided court, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).

16458 U.S. at 718.
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discrimination, as well as the argument raised in Justice Powell's dissent
that offering women the choice of a single-sex college was an important
17
governmental interest.
In addition to a dearth of favorable precedent, The Citadel and VMI
defendants faced several factual hurdles. First, both colleges have conceded that some women can perform as well as male cadets. 18 Second,
although both argued that the admission of women will require certain
changes, 19 neither identified any concrete harm that will result. In fact,
one of The Citadel's experts conceded at trial that The Citadel could still
fulfill its mission of educating citizen soldiers if women were admitted. 20
Counsel for VMI similarly conceded to the Supreme Court that VMI's
male-only policy, while unique, did not produce a different or better
leader than other colleges in Virginia. 21 Third, these two colleges are the
only remaining state military colleges in the nation. 22 The federal service
academies admitted women in 1976.23 Women serve in all branches of
the United States military, and the government recently eliminated the
exclusion of women from combat duty.2 4 Finally, all of the other public
colleges in Virginia and South
Carolina that were formerly single-sex
25
have become coeducational.
Seeking to shift the focus away from the exclusion of women, defendants in both cases constructed a narrative around what they defined as
governmental interests: the abstract goal of preserving "single-gender"
education and the unique traditions of VMI and The Citadel.26 Defendants then argued that the exclusion of women substantially relates to
these two interests. 27 In the story told by defendants, women and men
have "different educational needs" that justify segregating women in a
deliberately different and non-military program. 28 According to this view,

17458
1

U.S. at 727, 731, n.17.
i See, e.g., Testimony of Lt. Norman Doucet at Tr. Vol. II at 59-60, Faulkner, 858 F.
Supp. 552 (No. 2:93-488-2); Testimony of Richard Richardson at Tr. Vol. XII at 37,
Faulkner,858 F. Supp. 552; VMI 1, 976 F.2d at 896.
19 See Citadel Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact at 80-81, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp,
552 (No. 2:93-488-2) (on file with the Harvard Women's Law Journal); Brief for the
Cross-Petitioners at 34-35, VMI II, - U.S. _,
1995 WL 681099 (Nos. 94-1941,
94-2107).
20
Testimony of Richard Richardson at Tr. Vol. XII at 78, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552
(No. 2:93-488-2).
21 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 50, VMI11,
_ U.S.
, 1996 WL 16020 (1996)
(Nos.
94-1941, 94-2107).
22
See Citadel Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 19, at 9.
23
See Petitioners' Brief at 31 n.19, VMI II, - U.S. _
, 1995 WL 703403 (No.
94-1941).
24
See VMI II, 52 F.3d 90, 93-94 (Motz, J., dissenting).
25 VMI I, 976 F.2d at 894; Faulkner, 858 F Supp. at 556.
26
See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1415; Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 563-64.
27 VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1415; Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 555.
28See VMI 11, 44 F3d at 1234.
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the state's exclusion of women does not "invidiously" discriminate, but
rather protects women from the stress of these rigorous military programs.2 9
As the first step in this narrative, The Citadel and VMI redefined
themselves as "single-gender" colleges, rather than traditional male military colleges. 30 The Citadel and VMI next conflated these unique military
colleges with women's colleges and, in a sleight of hand, relied upon
research from women's colleges and secondary schools to argue that
"single-gender" colleges benefit men and women. 31 There are no studies
on men's colleges in the United States, which have all but disappeared
due to lack of demand; 32 studies of male secondary schools fail to
demonstrate any positive effects for male high school students, and some
demonstrate a negative effect. 33 Consequently, the expert witnesses for
both defendants cited outdated studies of women's schools and colleges
to justify the historical exclusion of women
from the unique military
34
education offered at The Citadel and VMI.
Defendants excluded from their narrative any mention of the history
of these military institutions or their role in Southern history and culture.
The Citadel and VMI were founded prior to the Civil War as state
military colleges that were restricted to men, the only people eligible to
join the military.35 In the nineteenth century most public colleges excluded women, not for pedagogical reasons, but because of the unquestioned belief that men and women should be educated separately. 36 The
29
See
30

VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.
See, e.g., VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1411-12; Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 564.

31 See, e.g., Deposition of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese at 124-28, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp

552 (No. 2:93-488-2); Richard Richardson, The Effects of Admitting Women to The
Citadel 14 n.1 (Apr. 4, 1993) (on file with the HarvardWomen's Law Journal).

32See Deposition of Alexander Astin at 153-54, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (No.
2:93-488-2). Reflecting this lack of demand, The Citadel cannot fill its ranks with men
from South Carolina; 50% of its cadets are from out-of-state, the highest percentage of

any public college in South Carolina. See Admissions Statistics for the Corps 1983-1984
(on file with the Harvard Women's Law Journal).
33 See Richardson, supra note 31, at 14; Deposition of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, supra

note 31, at 124-28; Brief of Amici Curiae of Carol Gilligan et al. in Support of Shannon
Faulkner
and United States at 28, Faulkner, 51 F.3d 440 (No. 94-1078).
34

Most of these studies examined either all-female elementary and secondary schools
or elite women's colleges during the 1970s. Higher education experts insist that these
studies' findings cannot be applied to present-day all-male colleges. Brief of Amici

Curiae of Carol Gilligan et al., supra, note 33, at 26-28.
35 South Carolina established The Citadel as a military college in 1842 at a state arsenal
in Charleston. Citadel History, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 13, 1995, at

A7. Because the legislature designated The Citadel as a military college, it "deemed it
appropriate" to exclude women. D. Reece Williams v. Robert McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134,
136 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971). Founded in 1839 as a military college,
VMI's male-only policy "simply reflected the unquestioned general understanding of the
time about the distinctively different roles in society of men and women" VMI II, 44
F.3d at 1243 (Philips, J., dissenting).
36 Deposition of Alexander Astin at 152-53, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (No. 2:93-4882).
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educational disenfranchisement of women reflected their treatment by
the state as "second-class citizens" and paralleled their exclusion from
the rights and opportunities afforded men. 37 By ignoring the history of
women's educational disenfranchisement and exclusion from the military, defendants portrayed women's demand for educational equality as
decontextualized and ahistorical.
The Citadel and VMI appropriated not only the empirical research on
women's colleges, but feminist theories of difference to prove that their
so-called "adversative" method of education is appropriate for men, but
not for women. For example, The Citadel's experts cited Carol Gilligan's
In a Different Voice to argue that women are more nurturing and concerned with relationships than men, who are concerned with formal rules
and authority. 38 The defendants' experts also drew heavily on research
that purportedly demonstrates that adolescent women suffer from lower
self-esteem and self-confidence than adolescent men. 39 Defendants concluded that although some women 40may be suited for this type of "adversative" education, most are not.
Defendants' story reifies VMI and The Citadel as institutions that
embody masculinity, which defendants argued is naturally the opposite,
or negation, of femininity. As a Citadel witness explained, "The program
is not designed for females' 41 Both colleges seek to develop the "whole
man" through programs that purportedly exalt
"masculine" traits such as
42
ferociousness, aggression, and competition.
37
1d. Women's colleges were founded to provide an education that women could not
obtain elsewhere. The meaning of "single-sex education" for women is situated in this
history and is therefore entirely different than for men, in the "same way that the
meaning of the historically black colleges is different than historically white colleges."
Id.3 at 155.
8See, e.g., Affidavit of Richard Richardson at 2, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (No.
2:93-488-2) (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982)). The Citadel
defendants asserted that:

College age women have less self-confidence than most college age men.
There is biological-neurological evidence showing that adolescent males tend
toward more impulsive and risk-taking behavior than females and therefore need
a more structured learning environment.
[M]en generally like and need a competitive atmosphere more than women.
Citadel
Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 19, at 47-48.
39
See VMI II, 852 F. Supp. at 480.
40
See, e.g., Citadel Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 19, at 51-52;
Brief For the Respondents at 28-32, VMI II, _
U.S. __ , 1995 WL 745011 (Nos.
94-1941, 94-2107) [hereinafter VMI Respondents' Brief].
41Rosanne Howard, Under Fire: A Would-be Cadet Quietly Storms The Citadel, CHI.
TRIB.,
Feb. 13, 1994, at § Womanews 1.
42 See, e.g., Citadel Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 19, at 47.
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In defendants' view, the admission of women is inherently incompatible with the masculine norms of these colleges. 43 If women were admitted into these male bastions, "[t]he ferocious discipline The Citadel
employs in its adversative educational methodology would disappear
...
,,44 Women would "impair[ ]"their methodology and "dilute[]" the
experience for men,45 "undermine the cohesiveness of the corps, ' 4 6 lower
standards, 47 and (curiously) "introduce potentially invidious distinctions
between male and female cadets?' 48 Neither South Carolina nor Virginia
claimed that the admission of women would destroy their ability to
educate leaders. Instead, they argued that women would necessarily
change these colleges and destroy their distinctive traditions.
As framed by defendants' narrative, the segregation of men and
women appears natural. Creating non-military programs for women at
Mary Baldwin and Converse Colleges supposedly does not segregate
women, but reflects "real" differences in the educational "needs" of men
and women. 49 Defendants' insistence on segregated education reinvokes
the normative belief in "separate spheres" for men and women: men
should be educated in a rigorous military environment that prepares them
for conflict, while women should be taught in a supportive environment
that teaches cooperation. This notion of natural difference and rigid sex
roles resonates with the more conservative social code of the South,
particularly with courts that would like to preserve the traditional social
roles of men and women.
Within defendants' narrative, Nancy Mellette and Shannon Faulkner
are demonized as gender outlaws. In an effort to explain their abilities
and interests in a military-style education, defendants would dismiss
women like Shannon and Nancy as aberrations from traditional norms
of femininity. For example, counsel for The Citadel asked Alexander
Astin, plaintiffs' expert witness, whether a woman interested in attending
The Citadel would be "that kind of woman" who "would not be all that
different from men?" After Astin wholeheartedly agreed, Patterson ended
50
his cross-examination, apparently satisfied that his point was made.
According to The Citadel defendants, "[W]omen who are more 'mascu43

For instance, defendants argued that because of the differences between men and

women, "[tihe adversative method would not be optimal for the development of the most
competitive and aggressive women in the nation." Id. at 106.
441d. at 80.
45
d. at 78.
46Id. at 80.
47
Id. at 81.
48
49

50

Id.

VM1 H, 852 F. Supp. at 476.

See Cross-examination of Alexander Astin by Robert Patterson at Tr. Vol. XVI at
99-100, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (No. 2:93-488-2). Susan Faludi described this
testimony as "express[ing] the precise point that the plaintiff's side had been trying to
make all along, and that The Citadel strenuously resisted: that the sexes were, in the end,
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line' than most men are the exception to the rule.' 51 Even worse, women
who seek a military education are not victims of invidious sex discrimination, but agents for the elimination of single-sex education for men
and women. As one expert witness asserted, Shannon Faulkner's selfish
desire for equal treatment "deprive[s] all the
individuals who want men's
52
single-gender education of their choice'

B. United States v. Virginia: The United States as the Unwelcome
Aggressor
As the sole plaintiff in the VMI cases, the United States failed to
construct a narrative that successfully' challenged either VMI's "singlegender" defense or its stereotypical assumptions. 53 The United States
argued that women were qualified to attend VMI and that the admission
54
of women would not impair VMI's ability to achieve its mission.
Although VMI had received over 300 inquiries from women who
sought admission, 55 the United States did not offer the testimony of any
of these women to explain her reasons for wanting to attend VMI or her
ability to perform as well as male cadets.5 6 The United States instead
relied on testimony by social science experts to prove that VMI's exclusion of women, and the segregation of women in the Mary Baldwin plan,
were based on gender stereotypes. 57 The United States primarily drew
on the successful integration of women into the federal service academies to refute VMI's claim that women would "destroy" VMI. 58 The
United States also introduced substantial evidence that the Mary Baldwin plan was inferior to VMI in numerous respects,
including its cur59
riculum, reputation, endowment, and faculty.
not all that different' Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, NEw
73.

YORKER,

Sept. 5, 1994, at

Citadel Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 19, at 46.
Deposition of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, supra note 31, at 144-45.
53The United States is authorized to bring an action in its own name to challenge
sexual discrimination in higher education. While the statute requires that a private
complaint be made to the United States, it does not require the complainant to be named
as co-plaintiff as long as the Attorney General certifies that the complaint is meritorious
and that the individual complainant is unable to prosecute the action because, inter alia,
the complainant cannot afford the expense or fears retaliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6
(1995).
54
See, e.g., VMI , 766 F. Supp. at 1413 n.8 (arguing that "success at West Point in
assimilating
women into the institution is proof that VMI could do likewise").
55
VM1 I, 976 F.2d at 894.
56
See VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1417-18; VMI II, 852 F. Supp. at 489-91.
57
See VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1415; VMI II, 852 F. Supp. at 489-90.
58
See VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1413 n.8.
59 See VMI II, 852 F. Supp. at 477-79.
51

52
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The United States, however, chose not to dispute VMI's contention
that single-sex education offered pedagogical benefits to men and women.
Consequently, the United States did not argue that state-sponsored segregation in higher education stigmatizes women or perpetuates sexist
attitudes and stereotypical beliefs about gender.60 Indeed, the Solicitor
institutions
General conceded that the state creation of two separate-sex
61
would not send any message that women were inferior.
In the VMI case, the district court held that the exclusion of women
was substantially related to the asserted state interests. 62 The court found
that while "some" women might succeed at VMI, "most" women would
not.63 While the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia had failed to articulate
an important policy that supports offering "the unique benefits of VMI's
type of education to men and not to women," it agreed that the evidence
supported the findings of the district court that the admission of women
would destroy VMI's unique methodology and "deny those women the
very opportunity that they sought:' 64 In light of its conclusions and "the
generally recognized benefit that VMI provides," the Fourth Circuit did
not order coeducation, but remanded the case to permit Virginia to
"parallel" programs or
propose a remedial alternative that might include
65
institutions or "other more creative options."
On remand, the courts approved the Mary Baldwin plan, even though
it "differs substantially" 66 from the VMI program and did not meet the
now-discredited test of "separate but equal" because it could not "supply
those intangible qualities of history, reputation, tradition, and prestige
that VMI has amassed over the years." 67 The district court found that
radically different educational methodologies were appropriate and natural: "If VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin marches
the march is over, both will have
to the melody of a fife and when
" 68
arrived at the same destination
Rather than frame the issue as the right of women to be treated as
equals, the courts framed the lawsuit as a direct attack by the federal
60

See, e.g., Valerie Lee, Single Sex Schooling: What is the Issue, in SINGLE-SEX

SCHOOLING: PERSPECTIVES FROM PRACTICE AND RESEARCH

39 (U.S. Dep't. of Educ.,

(on file with the Harvard Women's Law Journal).
Draft
61 Report, Dec. 22, 1992)

Transcript of Oral Arguments at 10-11, VMI 11,
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
(1996)
62
VMI 1, 766 F Supp. at 1415.
63
Id.at 1413.
F.2d at 897, 898.
64
65 VMI I, 976
ld. at 900.
66
67

-

U.S. __, 1996 WL 16020

VMI 11, 852 F. Supp. at 473.
Id. at 475.

68Id.at 484. The Fourth Circuit held that the remedial plan for women did not have
to be equal to VMI, as long as the benefits provided to each gender were "substantively

comparable" and did not tend "'to lessen the dignity, respect or societal regard' of
women." VMI II, 44 F.3d at 1234, 1242.

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 19

government upon a traditional Southern institution. Because Virginia did
not have to challenge the testimony of real female plaintiffs, it was able
to characterize the lawsuit as a life and death battle between VMI and
the federal government over states' rights. 69 The Virginia district court
agreed, characterizing the suit as a confrontation between the federal
government and VMI that traced back to the Civil War battlefield. 70 In
approving Virginia's remedial plan Judge Kiser also viewed the issue as
one of states' rights, concluding that Virginia is "exercising its sovereign
prerogative to structure its system of higher education."' 7' In rejecting
desegregation, Judge Kiser saw his role as that of preserving the traditions of Virginia: "VMI truly marches to the beat of a different drummer,
'
and I will permit it to continue to do so?. 72
In the VMI decisions, women as individuals are invisible. Without an
actual female student seeking admission, the courts were able to disregard the concrete harm to young women which resulted from their
exclusion from VMI and instead frame the legal issue as Virginia's right
to offer men a unique military-style education in a single-sex college.
Neither court appeared to believe that a "real" woman would want a
VMI education. Neither acknowledged the widespread interest among
women in VMI or the presence of women in the federal service academies and the military, other than to agree with the VMI defendants that
73
women had ruined West Point.
The VMI courts thus ignored the particular women who, like some
men, seek a military-style education, and substituted instead their idealized construction of "woman" whom they defined as the opposite of
"man?' Unlike actual women harmed by VMI's exclusionary policy, the
theoretical woman featured in the courts' narratives, whom Judge Kiser
referred to as "the female," 74 was not harmed by her exclusion from
VMI:
Gender discrimination, as a rule, works to the benefit of one group
and to the detriment of another. But in a real sense of the word,
that is not true in this case because, as the testimony of experts
demonstrates, it would be impossible for a female to participate in
the "VMI experience?' Even if the female could physically and
psychologically undergo the rigors of the life of a male cadet, her
introduction into the process would change it. Thus, the very
experience she sought would no longer be available.7 5
69
70

VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1408.

1d.
71VMI 11, 852 F. Supp. at 484.
72
73

74

VM1 1, 766 F Supp. at 1415.
See id. at 1413.

1d. at 1414.

751d.
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76
The Fourth Circuit agreed, labelling the problem "the Catch-22:
The absence of female candidates for admission as parties or witnesses also undermined the ability of the United States to challenge
effectively the defendants' stereotypical beliefs about men and women.
Without a female plaintiff, the United States relied on expert testimony
to challenge these gender stereotypes. Rather than offer the testimony of
an actual young woman, the United States created a hypothetical woman,
"Jackie Jones," who became the "allegor[y]" for those women who
might be interested in attending VMI.7 7 Construction of a "Jackie Jones"
valorized the notion that women are not diverse individuals, but formed
of one mold. A conservative and unsympathetic court was free to project
its values, expectations, and beliefs about women's roles on this fictitious female candidate. Because the VMI trial became a quintessential
battle of the experts, the district court could pick and choose from the
conflicting testimony without accounting for the real-life experience of
a woman like Nancy Mellette, whose potential for success at The Citadel
has been hailed by the former Commandant of The Citadel's Corps of
78
Cadets.
At both the liability and remedial stages, the courts accepted the
stereotypes of men and women offered by VMF 9 and concluded that
VMI's male-only policy was based upon "real" differences between men
and women. 80 Rejecting expert testimony for the United States that men
and women are more similar than different, the Fourth Circuit relied on
''common experience" to conclude that men and women are physically
and psychologically "different.' '81 The panel majority likewise referred
to social constructions of appropriate roles of men and women in concluding, without any support in the record, that "[i]f we were to place
women and men into the adversative relationship inherent in the VMI
program, we would destroy, at least for that period of the adversative
training, any sense of decency that still permeates the relationship between the sexes." 82 The judges did not base their genteel notion of
"decency" on empirical evidence, but rather on their beliefs about the

76 VMI I, 976 F.2d at 897.
77VMI 11, 852 F. Supp. at 481.
78Nancy McLaughlin, They Do Not Want Me There, NEWS & REcoRD (Greensboro,

N.C.), Oct. 15, 1995, at A12 (quoting the former Commandant as saying that he has "no
doubt that [Nancy Mellette would] be a leader there?').
79For example, the district court deemed it a fact that "[m]ales tend to need an
atmosphere of adversativeness or ritual combat in which the teacher is a disciplinarian
and a worthy competitor. Females tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere in which
the teacher is emotionally connected with the students?' VMI 1,766 F. Supp. at 1434.
80
See id. at 1432.
81VMI 1,976 F.2d at 897 (concluding that the United States' argument "might lead, if
accepted, to a finding that would impose a conformity that common experience rejects.
Men and women are different, and our knowledge about the differences, physiological

and psychological, is becoming increasingly more sophisticated.").
82 VMI 11,44 F.3d at 1239.
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social norms surrounding gender. Without reference to qualified female
candidates like Shannon Faulkner and Nancy Mellette, these courts could
ignore women whose qualities, experience, or interests conflict with
cultural stereotypes of gender. Rather than treat women as individuals
with different abilities and interests, the courts created an essentialized
"woman" who would not seek or benefit from VMI.
In permitting VMI to remain closed to women, the courts accepted
defendants' reification of VMI as a mythical and traditional glorification
of manhood. The district court found that the VMI experience employs
"an extreme form of the adversative method" 83 and that its male graduates "have a sense of having overcome almost impossible physical and
psychological odds" because "they have been put through great physical
pressures and hazards." 84 The Fourth Circuit likewise transformed VMI
cadets into larger-than-life warriors who fought valiantly in the Civil
War.85
To protect the myth of VMI as a bastion of masculinity requires the
exclusion of women: if women could succeed at VMI, its masculine
value would be lost. 86 Given that our nation's service academies have
admitted women for almost twenty years, the courts could not find that
the admission of women would render VMI unable to train citizen
soldiers. Instead, they decided that VMI would have to adopt "dual"
standards for women to accommodate physical differences and privacy
concerns 87 that "would tear at the fabric of VMI's unique methodology" 88 erode VMI's "egalitarianism," 89 and "adversely affect[]" the "morale" of the young male cadets. 90
C. Daughters of South Carolina Sue The Citadel
Unlike the VMI cases, The Citadel litigation has not centered around
the issue of "single-gender" education, but upon The Citadel's exclusion
of women, in particular, Shannon Faulkner and Nancy Mellette. Their
presence established the case as a battle between qualified young women
seeking admission to a public college and a powerful military college
bent on preserving its male-only tradition. By engaging in a campaign

83
VM
84

1, 766 F. Supp. at 1422.
1d. at 1426.
85 VMI 1, 976 F.2d at 892.
86
See, e.g., VMI I, 766 F. Supp. at 1412-13.
87 See VMI 1, 976 F.2d at 896.
88
1d. at 897.
89
90 1d. at 896.
VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1438.
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of massive resistance, South Carolina recalls its history of racial segregation in education and reveals its discriminatory intent against women.
As plaintiffs, Shannon and Nancy, whose credentials are impressive,
embody the story of exclusion based on sex: in all other ways they are
the perfect candidates for admission to The Citadel. An honor student
and athlete at Wren High School, 91 Shannon Faulkner applied to The
Citadel in January 1993.92 The Citadel immediately accepted her into its
Corps of Cadets. 93 Only after The Citadel discovered that she was female
did it conclude that she was unfit and withdraw its acceptance by letter
in February 1993. 94 Despite its assertion that its male-only policy does
not discriminate against women, The Citadel's letters to Shannon Faulkner first accepting her, then withdrawing its acceptance, enabled the
court and public to see sex discrimination in action.
Nancy Mellette's story similarly reveals the arbitrariness of The Citadel's discriminatory admissions policy. Nancy Mellette is an eighteenyear-old high school senior from South Carolina whose father is a Citadel alumnus; her brother is a senior in its Corps of Cadets. 95 Nancy does
not wish to threaten tradition, but like her brother, seeks to continue The
Citadel tradition in her family. To prepare for The Citadel, Nancy transferred to a military boarding school, where she is a first lieutenant,
member of its cadre and honor court, and letter athlete. 96 Unlike her
brother, she is barred from The Citadel simply because she is a woman.
The focus on Nancy and Shannon, two daughters of South Carolina,
roots their struggle for admission in the American traditions of equal
opportunity and individual rights. Nancy or Shannon become your daughter,
your sister, your neighbor's child, or yourself. While The Citadel tried
to follow VMI's strategy by litigating the case as an impersonal battle
for "single-gender" education, it was forced to fight Shannon Faulkner
and Nancy Mellette instead. Unlike the VMI litigation, the legal battle
between The Citadel parties immediately exploded into a full-fledged
gender war that exposed The Citadel's discriminatory policy and attitudes.
In opposing a preliminary injunction to admit Shannon into day
classes, The Citadel argued that her presence would distract male cadets
in classes, destroy its all-male tradition, and irreparably harm The Citadel and its male cadets. 97 One witness for The Citadel, Josiah Bunting,
now president of VMI, likened the admission of women to the introduc91
Affidavit
92

of Shannon Faulkner at 1-2, Faulkner,858 F. Supp. 552 (No. 2:93-488-2).
The Citadel's application did not ask the applicant's gender. Id. at 2.

93Id.
94
95
96

97

1d.
McLaughlin, supra note 78, at Al, A12.
1d.

Brief of Appellants at 20-27, Faulkner, 10 F.3d 226 (No. 93-2030).
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tion of a "toxic kind of virus" whose presence, even in small numbers,
would destroy the entire institution.98 The courts rejected The Citadel's
doomsday predictions of harm, and relied instead on testimony by The
Citadel's own witnesses that the school could still fulfill its primary
mission if women were admitted to the classroom, and that the academic
performance of male cadets would not be affected. 99
In granting the preliminary relief, the courts rejected defendants' effort
to frame the issue as the destruction of single-sex education. In contrast
to VMI, the courts explicitly framed the conflict as the right of the
individual to preliminarily enjoin the ongoing deprivation of her constitutional rights. 100 Finding that The Citadel's male-only admissions policy
likely violated Shannon Faulkner's right to equal protection, the district
court held that under federal law she is entitled to "the best solution that
we have available now" which he concluded was admission to the Day
Program at The Citadel. 10 1
In his majority opinion, Judge Niemeyer agreed that "[d]enying Faulkner's access... might likely become permanent for her"' 02 and that this
"time pressure, combined with an absence of present opportunity for
Faulkner," distinguished this case from VMI. 10 3 Judge Hamilton in his
dissent likewise viewed the lawsuit as a personal battle by women
seeking to attack The Citadel, claiming that the majority "[w]ithout
pause or demonstrated concern for the devastating effect of its action
...
emasculates a venerable institution by jettisoning 150 years of impeccable tradition and distinguished service"' 0 4
When Shannon Faulkner entered day classes in January 1994, The
Citadel's antagonism toward her and women in general became even
more visible. Her arrival was accompanied by tremendous media coverage nationwide that communicated visual images of exclusion: a woman,
alone, walking among uniformed cadets, all male. 0 5 Few cadets would
speak to her on her first day, with the notable exception of an African
American, Cadet Von Mickle, who publicly compared the exclusion of
women to the exclusion of African Americans. 0 6 The school newspaper
castigated Mickle in an anonymous column that described Shannon as
9

8Deposition of Josiah Bunting at 30, PatriciaJohnson v James Jones (No. 2:92-1674-

2).

99
Unreported Order at 75, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (Aug. 12, 1993) (No. 2:93-4882) (on file with the Harvard Women's Law Journal); Faulkner, 10 F.3d at 233.
0
1OSee Unreported Order, supra note 99, at 74.

101 d. at 76.

10210 F.3d at 233.

103Id.
041d. at 234 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
1 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Woman Begins Daytime Classes at The Citadel, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994, at A12.
06

See Mary Jordan, Around the South, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 13, 1994, at A3.
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'"The Divine Bovine," "The Shrew Shannon," and "Mrs. Doubtgender."' 1 7
The harassment and media attention continued throughout Shannon's
tenure as a day student, reflecting The Citadel's ceaseless attempts to
keep women out.108
The defendants continued to resist the courts' every effort to provide
Shannon Faulkner with some measure of equal treatment. South Carolina
twice refused to comply with the district court's orders to file a remedial
plan.10 9 Following a two-week hearing, the district court held that The
Citadel's male-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause.110 Because South Carolina had refused to offer any remedial
alternative, Judge Houck found that the only available remedy was to
order the immediate admission of Shannon Faulkner into the Corps of
Cadets."'
In contrast to the district court in VMI II, Judge Houck again framed
the remedial issue squarely within the doctrine of equal protection. The
court held that, in cases involving access to public higher education,
"time is of the essence"112 and that Shannon Faulkner was entitled to
immediate admission.'1 3 Judge Houck plainly saw the lawsuit as a battle
that pitted Shannon Faulkner and women in South Carolina against
South Carolina and The Citadel: "Not once has a defendant done anything to indicate that it is sincerely concerned to any extent whatsoever
about Faulkner's constitutional rights."'1 4 Most telling, the court found,
was the defendants' decision to spend millions of tax dollars in support
of a frivolous defense." 5 The court concluded that "all of the actions
witnessed by this court clearly and unequivocally indicate that the defendants would exert all of their considerable influence to insure that
107The Scarlet Pimpernel,BRIGADIER, Jan. 28, 1993, at 7. The column observed, "The

PIMP doth long to tame the PLASTIC COW on this most wondrous of nights but it
seems that we will have a live specimen, a home grown DAIRY QUEEN from the stables
of Powdersville. Perhaps NON DICKLE will be the first to saddle up." Id.

I08Shortly after the district court ordered that Shannon be admitted into the Corps in
August 1994, a billboard next to a highway in Charleston was changed overnight to read

"Die Shannon." Yardley Rosemar, A Tale of True Grit, NEws & REcoRD, Aug. 5, 1994,
at A15. Although the message on the billboard was attributed to Company H, a cadet
company at The Citadel, authorities could not verify that assertion.

109 See Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at 567.

110d. at 566. The court held that South Carolina had failed to prove that the exclusion

of women was substantially related to an important state interest. Id. It refused to find,
as defendants had requested, that South Carolina had a state policy of providing
"single-gender" education. Id. at 564.

M Id.at 568.
n 2 1d. at 569 (citing James Meredith v. Charles Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 352 (5th Cir.
1962)).
3
1d. at 568.
114
1d. at 567.
115
d. (criticizing the defendants for not offering a "single case.., in support of their
position that a lack of demand for single-sex education on the part of women justifies
its providing such an education only for men").
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the opportunity to enroll in ... a parallel
Faulkner would never have
' 16

institution or program.""
The Fourth Circuit likewise conceptualized this lawsuit as a battle of
particular women for equal treatment and framed the remedial question
in terms of the right of the individual to immediate relief from the denial
of constitutional rights. In his concurring opinion, Judge Hall wrote that
The Citadel and VMI cases are not about "single-gender" education, but
"have very much to do with wealth, power, and the ability of those who
have it now to determine who will have it later."' 17 Judge Niemeyer
appeared to be annoyed that South Carolina had not taken any steps to
propose or develop a remedial plan, despite being on notice for four
years that such a plan would be required."t 8 In affirming, however, the
court modified the remedial portion of the district court's order to afford
South Carolina yet another opportunity to develop and propose a remedial
plan before Shannon joined the Corps of Cadets in the fall of 1995.119
Despite the deadline imposed by the courts, South Carolina's resistance continued. It filed a proposal on June 5, 1995 to establish a
non-military program for women at Converse College. A Citadel alumni
organization donated $5 million to Converse in exchange for their agreement to host the program. 20 In July, the district court found that the
defendants had not complied in good faith with discovery and thereby
prevented the plaintiffs from adequately preparing for trial. 21 The court
scheduled a November trial date, and in doing so, cleared the way for
Shannon's admission.
Throughout the summer, The Citadel's resistance intensified as the
prospect of a woman joining the Corps grew more likely. The Citadel
opposed Shannon's request to try out for the marching band. 122 It refused
to assign Shannon a room in the barracks with male cadets and instead
proposed to house her in The Citadel's infirmary. 123 The Citadel filed a
motion to disqualify Shannon from admission alleging that she was
medically unfit. 24 The district court, however, found that under The
Citadel's own policy, Shannon would have been admitted if she were
25
male.
116

1d. at 568.

"17Faulkner,51

F.3d at 451 (Hall, J., concurring).
"8 See id. at 448.
19d.

20 See Program Agreement Between The Citadel and Converse College, supra note 7,
at 2.
121Order of District Court at 11-12, Faulkner, 858 F.Supp. 552 (Jul. 24, 1995) (No.
2:93-488-2).
122 Linda Meggett, Physical Condition Will Not Keep Faulkner Out, POST & COURIER

(Charleston, S.C.), July 27, 1995, at Al.
123 See Defendants' Proposed Contingency Plan For Admission of Shannon Faulkner at
2, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (June 5, 1995) (2:93-488-2).
124See Meggett, supra note 122, at Al.
125Id.
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Local opposition to Shannon's admission, and the lawsuit itself, mirrored The Citadel's animosity toward women. Residents of South Carolina bought anti-Shannon T-shirts and bumper stickers, reducing the
lawsuit to a personal campaign against a twenty-year-old woman. People
1 26
on campus wore T-shirts printed with "1,952 Bulldogs and 1 Bitch.'
The week before Shannon entered, pink bumper stickers adorned cars
throughout Charleston reading "It's a Girl!" and listing, incorrectly,
Shannon's weight. 127
After exhausting all of their appeals, The Citadel accepted Shannon
Faulkner into its Corps of Cadets on August 11, 1995.128 When Shannon
entered the Corps of Cadets in August 1995, the media again captured
images of exclusion: one woman sitting alone amongst hundreds of male
cadets who appeared to ignore her. After Shannon withdrew from the
Corps, the media broadcasted images of the male cadets gleefully celebrating Shannon's departure. 129 Cadets cheered, fists raised in victory, as
they surfed on mattresses across the floor of the barracks. 3 0 One cadet
wore a T-shirt emblazoned with a bottle of vodka and the slogan "Absolutely Male" 131 The public relations officer for The Citadel ended a
nationally televised interview three days after Shannon's departure by
proclaiming, "It's a great day at The Citadel!"' 132 The message conveyed
was not concern for single-sex education, but determination to exclude
women from The Citadel.
Shannon's admission into The Citadel offered numerous opportunities
to demystify the institution, as well as to rebut The Citadel's assertion
that women would materially change its program. In July 1994,133 and
again in June 1995,134 the defendants filed contingency plans detailing
12 6 See Faludi, supra note 50, at 75.

127 See Faulkner: New Cadet Doesn't Deserve Scorn for Breaking All-Male Tradition,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 18, 1995, at A14.

128 Frustrated in their efforts to obtain approval for the Converse plan, South Carolina

and The Citadel filed a motion with the Fourth Circuit to recall its mandate and stay the

admission of Shannon. Appellants' Motion for Recall and Stay of Mandate, Faulkner, 66
F.3d 661 (July 28, 1995) (No. 94-1978). The Fourth Circuit denied that application.
Faulkner, 66 F.3d 661. South Carolina then filed an emergency application for a stay
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and then Justice Scalia, both of whom denied the request.
See Frank J. Murray, Woman to Enter Citadel Today, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1995, at

Al. Defendants again filed a motion with the Fourth Circuit for a stay pending appeal,
which the court denied.
129 See, e.g., Schuyler Kropf, Cadets CelebrateAfter FaulknerLeaves, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Aug. 19, 1995, at A1; Images of '95, NEwSWEEK, Dec. 25, i995/Jan.
1, 1996, at 95.
130 See, e.g., Kropf, supra note 129.
131See Images of '95, supra note 129.
132
Good Morning America (ABC Television Broadcast, Aug. 21, 1995) (transcript on
file33with the Harvard Women's Law Journal).

1 See Defendants' Proposed Contingency Plan For Admission of Shannon Faulkner,
858 F. Supp. 552 (June 27, 1994) (No. 2:93-488-2).
Faulkner,
134 See Defendants' Proposed Contingency Plan For Admission of Shannon Faulkner,
Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (June 5, 1995) (No. 2:93-488-2).
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how The Citadel would integrate Shannon Faulkner into its Corps of
Cadets. Contrary to the findings of the courts in VMI, The Citadel's plans
did not require any material changes in their system. 135 Initially, The
Citadel did not attempt to modify its method of discipline for Shannon.
After plaintiff's counsel advised the Fourth Circuit of this fact, defendants revised their initial plan and asked Judge Houck in June 1995 to
order that the rules of its so-called "adversative" system would not apply
136
to Shannon, claiming that the system was inappropriate for women.
The district court denied defendants' request, holding that there were no
1 37
differences between men and women that would require such a change.

II. MAKING THE FEMALE PLAINTIFF VISIBLE
The power of judicial narrative to make individuals and history invisible is the power to exclude. By framing the dispute in VMI as a battle
between the United States and VMI over "single-gender" education, the
courts rendered invisible the young women who seek equal access to
VMI. Within this narrative of "single-gender" education, the fact that
VMI discriminates against qualified individual women disappeared, along
with the history of women's exclusion from public education and the
military. Women become invisible outsiders; their status as individuals
with legally enforceable rights is not recognized. The courts failed to
characterize the exclusion of women from VMI as state-sponsored segregation, a narrative choice that would have evoked parallels to racial
segregation and its ugly history.
Facts or events that fall outside the narrative framed by the courts
become invisible: "[W]hat does not get structured narratively suffers loss
in memory." 138 Once the courts excluded segregation from their narrative, the history and experiences of women and African Americans are
lost. VMI's exclusion of women became detached from the history of
women's exclusion from public education and the military.
By constructing women as "the other," the VMI decisions perpetuate
the myth that women are fundamentally and naturally different from
135See id. The Citadel uses a positive method of leadership training similar to that
used at West Point and the service academies. This method is distinctly different than
the so-called "adversative" method used at VMI. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
136Transcript of Hearing at 322, Faulkner 858 F. Supp. 552 (July 26, 1995) (No.
93:488-2). The Citadel also proposed to limit the number of cadets who could issue
"on-the-spot" corrections to Shannon. Because Shannon was the only female cadet, and
because the Citadel had refused to propose guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment,
Shannon did not object.
137Id.
138 BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 10, at 56.
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men. This myth of difference is a fundamental barrier to equal treatment
of women. The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that, like
African Americans, women have suffered "a long and unfortunate history of discrimination"'139 and that "throughout much of the nineteenth
century the position of women in our society was, in many respects,
140
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.'
Despite the similar history of discrimination and prejudice, the Supreme
Court considers classifications based on race inherently suspect, 141 while
affording gender classifications only intermediate scrutiny. 142 The assumption is that some differences between men and women may justify
differential treatment. The task of courts, therefore, is to distinguish
whether differential treatment of men and women is legitimate.
Under the standards of Curtis Craig v. David Boren143 and Mississippi
Universityfor Women v. Joe Hogan,144 courts have focused primarily on
whether a gender classification is based upon overly broad generalizations and stereotypes that reflect traditional notions about the relative
roles and abilities of men and women. This approach assumes-incorrectly-that individual judges are able to see and understand stereotypes
of gender. As the VMI decisions demonstrate, the myth of difference is
so powerful that discrimination against women often appears natural.
Almost all of the Supreme Court cases on gender discrimination involved male plaintiffs. 145 Litigating on behalf of male plaintiffs may help
establish abstract definitions of stereotypes or even gender discrimination, yet it does little to challenge the myth of difference or our expectations about who women and men should or can be. Nor does it offer
the opportunity to understand discrimination against women in a historical context.
As plaintiffs, Nancy Mellette and Shannon Faulkner challenge the
myth of difference. Both are real-life examples of women with non-traditional interests and ambitions: Nancy leads a company of both men
and women at Oak Ridge Military Academy; Shannon Faulkner faced
her first day at The Citadel with strength and determination. These
images not only challenge traditional constructions of gender, but undermine social science evidence that is (mis)used to support gender stereotypes.
139See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994); Sharron &
Joseph
0 Frontiero v. Elliot Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 687-88 (1973).

14 Frontiero,411 U.S. at 685.

14'See, e.g., Richard & Mildred Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
42

1 See, e.g., Curtis Craig v. David Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
143Id.

1'458
U.S. 718 (1982).
145 See MARY BECKER ET

AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 47-48 (1994).
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Focusing attention on one or two role models, however, can exert
tremendous pressure on these individuals. Shannon Faulkner and Nancy
Mellette have had to endure considerable media attention and public
scrutiny. To be with Shannon Faulkner in Charleston was to be constantly in the public's eye. Shannon could not eat dinner, walk through
the streets, or shop without attracting attention, both positive and negative. While she received many supportive comments, many people thought
nothing of treating her as though she were not a person. Despite Shannon's tenacity, public criticism weighed heavily on such a young, inexperienced woman.
When Shannon walked through The Citadel's gates on August 12,
1995 to become its first female cadet, she faced a phalanx of reporters
and television news crews intent on recording her every move. Local
supporters joined together to express their appreciation for Shannon's
efforts, encouraging her to "Go Girl!" Wives and girlfriends of Citadel
cadets and alumni, however, planted themselves immediately next to The
Citadel's gates, wearing black ribbons and handing out "Save the Males"
bumper stickers to freshmen and their families. The Citadel permitted
its supporters to distribute the bumper stickers at a reception for families
146
of entering students, which Shannon's parents attended.
The stress and loneliness were overwhelming for Shannon. She became
sick from the record-breaking heat in Charleston, as did a number of
male cadets. 147 Because of the stress, she could not keep food down. 48 In
the end, she found the pressure too much, as the public decided to treat
her as a flag-bearer or symbol for all women. She later explained that:
I now recognize that it was an impossible task to require myself
to perform under the world's spotlight in surroundings where I did
not have even a person to confide in. Being completely cut off from
the outside world, except for the glare of cameras, I felt stranded,
149
isolated and hated.

Although many male cadets routinely leave The Citadel without public
censure, Shannon faced criticism from all sides. Many feminists in
particular denounced her for not enduring the isolation she faced as a
cadet for the sake of all women. 50 In the haste to judge, we forget the
146Interview with Henry Weisburg, co-counsel to Shannon Faulkner, in Charleston,
S.C.47 (Aug. 12, 1995).

1 See

Faulkner Drops Out of Citadel, ROANOKE TI ES & WORLD NEws, Aug. 19,

1995, at Al.
148Affidavit of Shannon Faulkner at 2, Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (No. 2:93-488-2).
49
d. at 3.

150See, e.g., Sean Piccoli, Faulkner'sQuick Exit Pokes Hole in 'FeministJuggernaut',
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at A6.
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experience of Lloyd Gaines, the African American student who sued to
desegregate the University of Missouri law school in 1938, but who
disappeared before the lawsuit was completed.''
CONCLUSION
Shannon Faulkner fought for nearly three years and won a substantial
victory for women interested in attending The Citadel by breaking the
gender barrier there. While she was unable to fulfill her dream and wear
the ring of Citadel graduates, she inspired countless other women, including Nancy Mellette, with her courage and her grit. Since Shannon
left The Citadel, over 240 young women have written to The Citadel to
1 52
express interest in following her lead.
Nancy Mellette and Shannon Faulkner shifted the court's attention to
the rights of individual women, which are at the core of traditional equal
protection analysis. Despite tremendous personal costs, Shannon and
Nancy have inspired and empowered women to defy outdated notions of
women's roles and interests. The human cost of litigation demonstrates,
however, that courts should liberally certify class actions, in order to
protect young plaintiffs like Shannon and Nancy from the pressure of
public scrutiny and harassment.153 Class certification refutes the assumption that Shannon and Nancy are merely exceptions to traditional gender
norms and instead affirms that they embody generations of women to
whom South Carolina has denied equal educatinal opportunity.

15 1 See Robert Weiner, It's Not Easy Being a Pioneer,WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1995, at

A19.

152 See Citadel Told To ProcessApplications From Women, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1995,

at 3A.
53

1 The South Carolina district court found that plaintiffs have met all of the require-

ments of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) but so far has declined to certify a class. Hearing at 127,
Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. 552 (Oct. 3, 1995) (No. 2:93-488-2).

